Anthropology in conversation with an Islamic tradition : Emmanuel Levinas and the practice of critique by Rasanayagam, Johan
1 
 
Anthropology in conversation with an Islamic tradition: 





As an alternative to approaching Islam as an object for anthropological analysis, this 
article develops the idea of an anthropologist participating in a conversation going 
along within an Islamic tradition. The idea of a conversation is developed through the 
ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and his ideal of knowing as a ethical relation 
with an infinite other. Levinas opposes a sterile and oppressive relation of ‘totality’ 
where the knowing self encompasses the other within concepts and thought that 
originate in the self, with a critical and creative relation of ‘infinity’ in which the 
alterity of the other is maintained and invites conversation that brings the self into 
question. The article discusses recent disciplinary discussions of how anthropology 
should engage with alterity that have been framed in terms of ontology and post-





How can, or perhaps more importantly how should, anthropology engage with 
Islam? I was first prompted to revisit this problem by a response in the question and 
answer session following a talk I gave at a university anthropology department in the 
US on the topic of Islam in Uzbekistan. The questioner, a Muslim, said that he had 
2 
 
been offended by my presentation. I had been talking about lived experience as a 
site for the development of moral selves. A person comes to an understanding of 
what it is to be a Muslim, I had argued, through rituals and practices that refer to 
Muslim histories and sacred texts, but also in the ongoing flow of experience, in 
marrying off their children successfully, helping a neighbour to build a house, 
participating fully in a sociality of neighbourhood and kinship, and perhaps more 
problematically for my questioner, in dream or waking interaction with spirits, often 
in the context of illness whether as a patient or a healer. I sought to engage sincerely 
with the experience of individual Muslims in Uzbekistan. But the questioner felt that 
I was misrepresenting what Islam is truly about, that I was presenting beliefs and 
practices that many Muslims would themselves view as humanly produced tradition, 
the misunderstandings or non-Qur’anic practices of some Muslims, as standing for 
Islam itself. 
 
I was taken by surprise by the response because this is not a new problem and one I 
thought had long been resolved. It was the central concern of disciplinary debates in 
the 1970s and 1980s from which the ‘anthropology of Islam’ emerged as a subfield. 
Those debates revolved around the question of how to frame the diversity in the 
practice and belief that anthropologists encountered in located communities, 
groups, and individuals within Islam as a global analytical object. Had I, with the best 
intentions of respecting the self-presentations of individuals who identified as 
Muslim, unwittingly drifted back into a stance somewhat similar to that Robert 
Launay has described as typical of anthropologists prior to these debates (Launay 
1992: 2); that is, a concern for located ways of perceiving and being that implicitly 
treated Islam as an extrinsic phenomena, something that might have been 
understood as syncretically adapted within local cultural systems or practices, while 
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at the same time presenting my analysis as about Islam itself? At issue is whether 
and to what extent an anthropologist, who may or may not be Muslim, can take 
Islam seriously. Framed like this the question is one that has recently been revisited 
more generally in the discipline, in the discussions around what some of its 
proponents have called the ‘ontological turn’, as well as discussions among 
anthropologists working with Christianity about the relationship between 
anthropology and theology. In this article I want to think about an anthropological 
engagement with Islam, and with alterity more generally, by reflecting on Emmanuel 
Levinas’s ideal of knowing as a critical, ethical relation with an infinite other. It is an 
attempt to move away from approaching Islam as our object of study to participating 
in a conversation going along within an Islamic tradition.  
 
Anthropology of Islam 
In his book The Calligraphic State the anthropologist Brinkely Messick writes that a 
‘central problem in Muslim thought concerns the difficult transition from the unity 
and authenticity of the Text of God to the multiplicity and inherently disputed quality 
of the texts of men’ (Messick 1993: 16-17). Messick succinctly expresses the tension 
between unity and diversity that has produced widely differing approaches to sacred 
text by Muslims. An anthropology of Islam that confines itself to a study of different 
approaches to sacred text, how competing understandings and interpretations are 
debated, contested and enforced would, however, not address the problem I have 
already alluded to in relation to my own research in Uzbekistan, that is the non-
scripturally founded practice and experience that, for many Muslims, contributes 




In the 1970s and 1980s much of the debate that attempted to delineate Islam as an 
object that could be approached ethnographically revolved around questions of 
system, structure or scale. Islam, it was suggested, should be approached in terms of 
local historically developed symbolic systems, as Moroccan, Indonesian, or other 
culturally inflected variants of Islam (Geertz 1968), as the articulation of a global 
Islam with local political, economic, and social circumstances (Eickelman 1982; 
Manger 1999), or with Gellner’s often critiqued idea of Islam as a composite of a 
scripturally founded Great Tradition and locally specific ‘folk’ variants (Gellner 1981). 
 
In contrast to approaches that fashioned an object of Islam as an artefact of the 
observer’s own work of analysis, other anthropologists took Muslims themselves as 
their starting point in an effort to approach Islam in its own terms. Two contributions 
that best express this effort are those of Abdul Hamid el-Zein and Talal Asad. El-
Zein’s response to diversity of practice, including that not founded directly on 
scriptural interpretation, was to advocate a full recognition of the legitimacy of 
diverse local islams. This position explicitly rejects a distinction between theological 
and folk Islam in anthropological analysis (el-Zein 1977). He anticipates Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro’s more recent call for the ‘ontological self-determination of the 
world’s peoples’ (Viveiros de Castro 2003), to which I will return below, in asserting 
that this categorical distinction privileges scholarly theology, and the anthropological 
project itself, as being more systematic, reflective, and addressed to ultimate 
questions of cosmology. For el-Zein, folk and formal theology are both reflections on 
the unity of God and nature, but while formal theology takes the Divine text of the 
Qur’an as its starting point, folk theology starts from nature and subsumes the 
Qur’an within that order. Whatever criticisms might be made of this position, from 
the standpoint of scripturally grounded interpretation that it legitimates heterodoxy 
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and polytheism, as the respondent to my talk might have argued, or from an 
anthropological disciplinary position that it makes it impossible to identify Islam as 
an object of analysis at all, el-Zein encourages anthropologists to take as their 
starting point the practice and belief of those who identify themselves as Muslim, 
and he does so from an intelligibly Islamic position of tawḥīd, the unity of God and 
creation. 
 
Asad’s reply in his influential paper The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam is also a call 
to take Muslims seriously in their own terms. He is equally critical of essentialist 
distinctions between Great and Little Traditions. At the same time, for Asad Islam 
cannot be identified as simply anything a Muslim believes or practices. Rather, an 
anthropology of Islam ‘should begin, as Muslims do, from the concept of a discursive 
tradition that includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the Qur’an and the 
Hadith’ (Asad 1986: 14). The discursive element of this formula pays attention to the 
relations of power, the institutions and processes through which orthodoxies, visions 
of an ideal Muslim past, present, and future, are debated and established as 
hegemonic. Asad’s concept of a tradition, which he takes from Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
work on virtue (MacIntyre 2007), is what locates the anthropological object of study 
in something distinctively Islamic. The debates, disputes, and struggles over the 
nature of a Muslim community and person are conducted in terms of shared, 
historically developed conceptions of Muslim pasts and futures, anchored in the 
founding sacred texts.  
 
With Asad’s intervention the disciplinary debates over defining Islam as an analytical 
object seemed to have run their course. In the following two decades questions of 
definition were largely put to one side and anthropologists turned their attention to 
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exploring the lives and experiences of Muslims and how Islam is lived. Attention has 
been focused on the differing and often competing strands of interpretation among 
Muslims and their efforts to debate and authorise correct practice (eg. Bowen 1993; 
Horvatich 1994). In the 2000s ground breaking works were produced on the topic of 
piety that not only illuminate the efforts of Muslims to develop moral subjectivities, 
but decentre concepts at the heart of the idea of secular modernity, such as the 
primacy of human freedom and the idea of modernity itself (Deeb 2006; Mahmood 
2005).  
 
The tension expressed in the positions of el-Zein and Asad, however, has not 
disappeared. Alongside the work that focused on differing relations to sacred text or 
Muslim piety, others have addressed practice where the question of what can or 
should legitimately be understood as Islam is much more ambiguous and contested, 
not least by Muslims themselves, such as experiences of spirit possession (McIntosh 
2004; Nourse 1996), or they have argued that Muslim (and other) selves are 
addressed to multiple, often contradictory referential frames, rather than being 
unitary and coherent (Ewing 1997; Louw 2012). The question of what 
anthropologists are actually studying when they engage with Muslims has once more 
explicitly re-emerged in critiques of an over-emphasis in recent anthropological work 
on questions of piety (Marsden 2005; Marsden & Retsikas 2013). In Samuli Schielke’s 
words, there is ‘too much Islam in the anthropology of Islam’ (Schielke 2010: 2). The 
risk Schielke identifies is that of essentialism, presenting a single aspect of the life of 
a Muslim, those pious moments, as standing for the whole. For the majority, Schielke 
argues, moral subjectivities are characterised more by ambiguity and diversity of 
referential frames, than by a neat coherence. Instead, these anthropologists call for 
attention to be paid to the ‘everyday’ life and experience of people who happen to 
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be Muslim, to recognise the ‘humanity of people on their own terms’, to develop a 
‘grounded and nuanced understanding of what it means to live a life’ (Schielke 2010: 
5).  
 
This move has itself provoked the counter-critique that privileging ‘everyday Islam’ 
reproduces a secular humanist perspective, that it sets up an opposition between a 
supposedly natural human condition of scepticism, uncertainty, and freedom, and an 
exceptional or impossible state of pious conformity to doctrinal norms, which refuses 
to take seriously those it frames as exceptional pious subjects (Fadil & Fernando 
2015). The anthropology of Islam appears to have returned to the debates of three 
decades ago, only with a perhaps a more contemporary concern for ‘taking seriously’ 
Islam and Muslims. We cannot take some Muslims seriously, it seems, without 
dismissing the experience and perspective of other Muslims. 
 
The problem, I argue, is with the idea of an object itself. Even Asad’s seemingly broad 
idea of Islam as a discursive tradition ultimately positions the anthropologist as judge 
who decides which process or reference is noted as belonging to the Islamic 
tradition, what is really Islamic and what is not. I want to suggest that Islam, if it ever 
becomes an object, does so only in the moral reasoning of an individual Muslim, 
whether through the directed processes of ethical self-formation that a number of 
anthropologists have productively described, or in the going on of life with all its 
ambiguities, contradictions, and multiplicity of referential frames. Any personal 
understanding of Islam cannot be represented in a general object without doing 
violence to those understandings. In this sense, there are as many Islams as there are 
Muslims. Simply sidestepping the problem of definition by following Schielke’s call to 
make life experience our focus is not the answer. There are two problems here. 
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Firstly, it means that anthropologists would abandon any attempt to engage with 
Islam directly or with Muslims as Muslims, and instead produce ethnographies of 
lives within which Islam may or may not be an important reference. Secondly, taking 
life experience as our focus carries with it the danger of implicitly treating Islam, 
once more, as an extrinsic object that is reproduced, adapted, creatively refashioned, 
in lives lived.  
 
In this article I want to think about how an anthropologist might engage with Islam 
directly, actively, and ethnographically, but without making Islam or Muslims our 
objects. It is a suggestion for a move from an anthropology of Islam to doing 
anthropology in conversation with an Islamic tradition. I am inspired by and develop 
upon a direction of research present in the work a number of anthropologists writing 
on Islam, including Asad and Schielke themselves. In a recent clarification of his idea 
of tradition Asad writes that he uses the concept to ‘address both the use of 
inherited language and the acquisition of embodied abilities by repetition’ (Asad 
2015: 167), how a Muslim learns to embody dispositions, sensibilities and 
propensities, to change themselves and their environment. While the scope of Islam 
as an object for anthropology may actually be narrowed with this focus, Asad 
developed it in conversations with an Islamic scholar in Cairo, Shaykh Usama Sayyid 
al-Azhari, in which Shaykh Usama talked about the education of good character, how 
human beings are formed with particular intentions in the different contexts of social 
life, the household, the school, the mosque or the street.  
 
The point here is that Asad is not making Shaykh Usama his ‘informant’ and their 
conversations his ‘ethnographic data’, but he develops his thinking in conversation 
with an other. As I will develop below through a discussion of Levinas’s ethical 
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philosophy, this is what for me makes his endeavour distinctively anthropology. 
Similarly productive conversations have informed the writing of other 
anthropologists. Schielke, in the conclusion to his book Egypt in the Future Tense, 
begins to think about the nature of hope in an uncertain world in conversations with 
young men in his fieldsite about Islamic ideas of destiny and freedom (Schielke 
2015). A further example is Amira Mittermaier’s study of Sufism in Cairo that 
critiques oppositions between ‘the imagined’ and ‘the real’ through the Islamic 
concept of barzakh, the ‘in-betweenness’ of this world and the next (Mittermaier 
2011). 
 
I want to bring this approach into dialogue with discussions going along similar lines 
more broadly in the discipline. I have taken inspiration from Tim Ingold’s move from 
an anthropology ‘of’ to an anthropology ‘with’ (Ingold 2008; Ingold & Lucas 2007), as 
well as the call by Joel Robbins for anthropologists to engage more closely with 
theologians, to ‘imagine that theologians might either produce theories that get 
some things right about the world they currently get wrong or model a kind of action 
in the world that is in some or other way more effective or ethically adequate than 
their own’ (Robbins 2006: 287). Both these calls are expressions of what I see as the 
motivating impulse of anthropology, the recognition of radically different ways of 
being and perceiving, also expressed in the recent discussions framed in terms of 
ontology (Viveiros de Castro 2003). All these interventions, moreover, point to how 
this is as much an ethical as an intellectual practice. 
 
The philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas for me clarifies how the ethical and the 
intellectual are bound together in anthropological practice. As set out in his major 
work Totality and Infinity (1969), Levinas develops an ideal of knowing that is 
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founded on a relation, a conversation with an other that maintains difference, not in 
order to oppose or exclude, but where it is the conversation with alterity that itself 
makes knowing possible, productive and creative. Knowing is a critical and ethical 
endeavour. Levinas’s thought resonates with disciplinary concerns that have been 
expressed in the self-reflexive critiques of objectivity and representation of the 
1980s (Clifford & Marcus 1986; Rosaldo 1989) through to the more contemporary 
discussions of ontology. For me, Levinas clarifies what is at stake and points to how 
to think through anthropology as scholarly discipline and human practice. 
 
Levinas and anthropology 
Levinas’s aim in Totality and Infinity is to establish the primacy of ethics in the 
encounter of the knowing self with a world populated by others. My relation with an 
other should not be one of domination where I encompass the other within my own 
projects and thought concepts, a relation Levinas designates as ‘totality’. Instead, I 
should enter into conversation that recognises the alterity of the other that cannot 
be contained in anything that originates in my self, that overflows my self, and so 
step beyond my self. This is what Levinas designates as a relation of ‘infinity’. At the 
centre of Levinas’s thinking is an idea of the human person as radically singular, so 
that a person cannot be thought of as a representative of a general category or a 
member of a species (Mensch 2015: 4). The other is absolutely Other and cannot be 
encompassed by categories or understandings originating in the self: ‘The other 
presents himself as exceeding the idea of the other in me’ (TI: 50). Truth for Levinas is 
only possible when the knowing self can step outside the sameness of his or her own 
existence. This occurs in conversation with an other ‘where the same, gathered up in 
its ipseity as an ‘I’, as a particular existent unique and autochthonous, leaves itself’ 
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(TI: 39). Thus Truth for Levinas is founded in the ethical relation, defined by the 
recognition of, and conversation with, the alterity of an other.  
 
Levinas positions his philosophy in large part in opposition to Martin Heidegger’s 
ontology of being. He thus contrasts two modes of knowing or theory, ontology and 
critique (TI: 42-8). For Levinas ontology designates theory that seeks comprehension, 
assimilating the other to the same so that alterity vanishes. This may be effected 
through the use of a middle term, a thought concept, that reduces the other to a 
generality that originates in the self. Heideggerian ontology for Levinas reduces 
others and the world to a relation with Being, absorbed into my own projects. This 
mode of knowing, ‘totiality’, is ‘identified with the freedom of the knowing being 
encountering nothing which, other with respect to it, could limit it’ (TI: 42). 
 
Critique, by contrast, maintains the distance between self and other. Truth is 
produced in a conversation with the other where alterity is not overcome or 
neutralised, nor does alterity present a barrier preventing engagement, but rather 
the conversation with alterity is the productive source of self-critique. ‘The 
strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my 
possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as 
ethics’ (TI: 43). Freedom is opposed to ethics. The totalising relation is for Levinas not 
only a tyranny but it is also sterile, it produces nothing but more of the same. The 
relation of infinity, the overflowing of the self where I am prompted to examine 
reflexively my normal spontaneous being, is critique that is productive of true 




Two objections might be made to Levinas’s philosophy with regards to anthropology. 
Firstly, his insistence on the essential separation of self from other would seem to be 
founded on a conception of autonomous personhood that the general direction of 
anthropological thinking over past decades has called into question. Secondly, is 
Levinas’s philosophy really an expression of Jewish theology that has limited 
relevance outside a Jewish, or at least a theistic, tradition? Samuel Moyn, who has 
traced the roots of Levinas’s thinking, not only in Jewish writing but also in 
Protestant theology, argues that Levinas’s  Other is in fact  ‘a secularised appeal to 
the divine, a God, in humanised form’ (Moyn 2005: 239). The human other, rather 
than God, becomes the transcendent source of Truth.  
 
For Levinas it is the radical uniqueness of the person that establishes the condition of 
interiority and separation that makes knowing possible. This uniqueness is founded 
upon our sensuous, embodied immersion in the world, prior to and exceeding our 
representation of it, that Levinas expresses with the notion of ‘enjoyment’ (Mensch 
2015: 83-6). Leora Batnitzky has argued that central to Levinas’s thought is 
Descartes’s modern subject, separate and independent, although for Levinas 
interiority is not a product of self-representation in thought but rather of sensual 
experience (Batnitzky 2004). This separation is the condition for the ethical relation. 
Our needs, and their bodily satisfaction, establish our uniqueness that can then be 
escaped in a relation with an other. This in contrast to Heidegger’s idea of ontology 
where our needs, our projects, place us already outside ourselves in the world, 
excluding the notion of interiority and therefore of ethics in Levinas’s terms (Mensch 




Levinas’s idea of the primary human condition being that of a ‘particular existent 
unique and autochthonous’ would seem to be fundamentally incompatible with the 
conceptions of personhood as intersubjective, relational, porous or fractal that 
anthropologists have encountered in their participation in other ways of being and 
perceiving. Furthermore, the person for Levinas would seem to be confined to the 
human person. Language is what enables the knowing self, in conversation with an 
other, to reach beyond the visual representation that encompasses the other, 
towards the ethical relation (Mensch 2015: 115). This is part of what Levinas 
expresses in his idea of the ‘face’: 
The face is present in its refusal to be contained. In this sense it cannot be 
comprehended, that is, encompassed. It is neither seen nor touched – for in 
visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the alterity of the 
object, which becomes precisely a content. (TI: 194) 
It is through language that the infinity of the other is recognised and maintained: 
In discourse the divergence that inevitably opens between the Other as my 
theme and the Other as my interlocutor, emancipated from the theme that 
seemed a moment to hold him, forthwith contests the meaning I ascribe to 
my interlocutor (TI: 195) 
Can Levinas’s ethical relation, established by language, take place with non-human 
persons, be they non-human animals, spirits, or the land, or would the ‘imagination’ 
of such a relation be an extension of the self? What of a person’s encounters with 
material objects? 
 
My response is that I do not intend to develop Levinas’s philosophy as Grand Theory 
that can be applied as an explanatory model for lives, societies or process that I 
encounter. That would of course be to establish a relation of totality in Levinas’s 
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terms. Rather, I am thinking through Levinas to elucidate practice that I see already 
going on within anthropology, to foreground it and develop from this a non-
objectifying engagement with Islam. I am thinking through Levinas to identify the 
ethical quality of my knowing as an anthropologist, a position from which I can step 
outside or ‘overflow’ in a relation with others. The ‘alterity’ of Levinas’s philosophy 
with relation to the modes of being and perceiving of others I might engage with is 
not a problem but the condition of knowing. Levinas establishes knowing not as the 
identification or establishment of coherence between my own concepts and others 
but rather as a creative emergence in the space between self in conversation with an 
infinite other. The practice of anthropology in fact extends the possibility of the 
other beyond the human, but Levinas provides the grounding upon which the non-
human might be engaged without being reduced to a product of cultural or social 
representation. This is the ethical relation that takes me outside my spontaneous 
existence. Levinas’s ethical relation serves as a reminder that my encounters and the 
knowing that results from them, whether with human or non-human others, 
genuinely are encounters with alterity and not disguised extensions of the self. 
 
The second objection, that Levinas’s philosophy is just a disguised theology, is in 
large part already addressed in the foregoing discussion. It does not matter that 
Levinas draws his ideas from Jewish or Christian thought. Firstly, I am not seeking to 
comprehend Islam through Levinas but to identify an ethical mode of knowing going 
on in anthropology. Furthermore, Levinas’s call is to step outside my self in 
conversation with an other, to allow an other to challenge my existing conceptions. If 
Levinas develops his own thinking in conversation with a Jewish and Christian 





Levinas’s thought complicates the idea of anthropology as it is expressed in the 
commonly invoked phrase ‘making the familiar strange and the strange familiar’, that 
was at one time a strap line on my own department’s website. Anthropology as an 
intellectual endeavour has always been critical. Anthropologists have sought to 
decentre what they see as categories of thought that are taken by themselves, their 
academic audiences, and their students to be natural and universal, by engaging with 
different ways of being and perceiving that they encounter in their fieldwork. 
Categories supposed to be universal are exposed as being the product of contingent 
cultural or discursive regimes, now identified as located ‘western’, ‘secular’, or 
‘scientific’ worldviews. Melford Spiro (1992) has expressed this critical work as a 
process of translation. Not a direct translation of the Other into the native language 
of the anthropologist, but rather translation via a third conceptual vocabulary 
invented by the anthropologist, which both makes the seemingly exotic thought and 
practice of the Other intelligible after all, and also prompts a re-thinking of the 
taken-for-grantedness of the world of the anthropologist’s audience. A classic 
example would be Mauss’s work on the gift. With a new vocabulary of ‘total social 
phenomena’, ‘obligation’, and ‘spirit of the gift’, the word and idea of the ‘gift’ is 
alienated from ‘our’ language and becomes a vehicle for comparing radically diverse 
modes of exchange and the ‘social’, ‘cultural’ or ‘moral’ contexts in which they are 
embedded.  
 
While the critique that is sought in anthropology’s project of ‘making the familiar 
strange and the strange familiar’ would seem to be in harmony with Levinas’s ideal 
of knowing, if this is achieved as Spiro has pointed out through means of translation 
via a third thought concept, then it is in danger of being a species of the totalising 
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relation that Levinas opposes. A representation of generalised cultural systems, 
social structures, or worldviews is produced, not only ‘theirs’ but ‘ours’ as well 
(Western, secular, scientific). This problem has been recognised by anthropologists 
since the critique of the culture concept initiated in the 1980s that highlighted issues 
of representation and objectivity. In order to avoid this, a common approach has 
been for anthropologists to practice something similar to what Lila Abu-Lughod has 
called ‘ethnographies of the particular’ (Abu-Lughod 1991).  
 
For Abu-Lughod, anthropologists’ use of the culture concept to represent and 
compare difference is a form of Edward Said’s Orientalism. A generalised self is 
produced in relation to a generalised other. Essential difference between culture 
groups is fabricated by ignoring and flattening difference in ways that enable 
hierarchies of value and relations of domination. In relation to Islam, she has argued 
that this kind of generalising, Orientalising thinking has resulted in discourses of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam. The diverse and complex interpretations of what it means to 
be a Muslim, the debates among Muslims themselves, is flattened under labels of 
moderate or extremist (Abu-Lughod 2006). Her answer is an ethnographic 
engagement with particular lives located in time and place that does not generate 
opposition between self and other. The de-essentialising move to explore global 
processes, not as reified phenomena in themselves, but as how they are lived and 
given significance in particular lives, might be said to have become the default 
position for anthropological research. The literature on ‘the state’ produced since 
the mid-1990s is illustrative. This work has explored how an idea, experience or 
effect of the state emerges in everyday encounters with officials, government 
offices, in practices of corruption, or in material manifestations of roads and 
buildings (Furguson & Gupta 2002; Gupta 1995; Harvey 2005; Reeves 2014). It has 
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productively critiqued the very idea of the state as a taken-for-granted ‘real’ entity or 
phenomenon, and stimulated new ways to think about it. 
 
But in Levinas’s analytic it is precisely the conversation with alterity that enables me 
to exceed my self. By eliminating the distance between self and other as Abu-Lughod 
seeks to do, I do not necessarily escape my own thought. I start from a thought 
concept, for example the state that originates in established disciplinary thinking, 
and finish with multiple, more nuanced, ways of imagining this same thought 
concept. I do this by imagining my concept into the lives of the people I encounter in 
fieldwork, the inspiration for thinking through concepts that are essentially my own. I 
do not mean that attention to the particular is illegitimate or not worthwhile, nor 
that because the state is an established disciplinary concept it should not be thought 
through in different ways. Recognition of the particularity of individual lives is in part 
how I understand Levinas’s ideal of the irreducible individuality of a person. But 
Levinas points to an essential aspect of the person, that any person I encounter is not 
the same as me, and cannot be totally encompassed by thought that originates in 
me. The other cannot be comprehended but should be engaged with in 
conversation, and it is their very difference that prompts critique and creativity. This 
is not true only for ‘exotic’ others, but any other. It neutralises the Orientalised Other 
that Said and Abu-Lughod are combatting, not by trying to overcome or eliminate 
distance between self and other, but precisely by recognising the irreducible alterity 
of the other and making this the source of a critical, ethical, relational mode of 
knowing. 
 
Anthropology in conversation…  
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Levinas’s ideal of knowing provides a further challenge to a conception of 
anthropology in terms of a division between fieldwork, where an anthropologist 
gathers data while participating in the ambiguities and anxieties of life and personal 
relationships, and the work of analysis, the crafting of ordered, descriptive accounts 
and theory from notes and other material gathered during fieldwork that seek to 
understand and represent other ways of being and perceiving. Instead, what is 
brought to the fore is transformation effected in that anthropologist. Encounters and 
conversations with others, irreducibly other to the knowing self, call into question 
some of the perceptions and thought categories that an anthropologist brings with 
him or herself. This might be in personal encounters with human others or other-
than-human, or with texts. Writing then is an activity of reflection on this 
transformation. 
 
In this section I want to start with an encounter during a research trip to Morocco 
that interrupted my own ‘spontaneity’. Rather than providing a thorough refection 
on this encounter itself, I use it as a springboard to think about what anthropology 
‘in conversation’ might be. I want to reflect on recent disciplinary discussions about 
anthropology as an ethical project and mode of knowing that I think are broadly 
represented by three distinctive contributions, those of Michael Carrithers, Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro, and Tim Ingold. 
 
In 2014 I was developing a new research project in and around Fes, Morocco. The 
research concerns sacred text and its performance in, for example, recitation, 
memorisation, or healing. On a visit to explore potential research sites I came across 
cases of jinn spirit possession. One such encounter occurred in my visit to a town 
near Fes with a young man who was helping to introduce me to people who might be 
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able to help with this. He told me about an exorcism that was being conducted by an 
imam he knew, and the imam and the family involved agreed for me to be present 
on condition that I agreed in turn to being invited to convert to Islam. On arrival, I 
was shown how to perform the ritual ablution (wuḍū’) by one of the sons of the 
household and then shown into the salon where the imam was already present, 
along with the sister of the young man who had helped me perform the ablution. On 
a table in front of the brother and sister was a five litre bottle of water and a large 
glass mug each, as well as a bucket. As the imam started reciting verses from the 
Qur’an the sister began to grimace and tense up as if in pain. She pleaded for the 
imam to stop, and I took this to be the jinn speaking through her. As the recitation 
went on, the young woman became more and more agitated, twisting her body and 
threw back her head and shouted out, seemingly in pain. The imam began to 
harangue the jinn, demanding that the jinn leave the woman. The jinn pleaded and 
promised to depart, and the imam interrogated the jinn, asking if the jinn were a 
man or woman, calling it a liar, saying that a Muslim jinn would never possess 
someone. During the recitation both the brother and sister drank large quantities of 
water, vomiting it up from time to time. I found the whole experience disorienting, 
unsettling, and a little frightening. The young man assisting me with the research 
later told me that the imam had been treating the sister for some time, but had just 
started with the brother as well. He also told me that the imam tried to convert the 
jinn he exorcised to Islam. After this session was over, the imam demanded of me 
forcefully, as he had done of the jinn, that I too should become a Muslim, that there 
was no reason not to now that I had seen the evidence of this possession. 
 
How should I respond to this encounter that is so far outside my normal 
understanding of what is possible or ‘real’? This is of course a common and recurring 
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question for anthropologists. It is one that I confronted in my previous research in 
Uzbekistan where people recounted their own waking and dream encounters with 
spirits and jinn, where the recited verses of the Qur’an imparted healing qualities to 
material objects that could be transferred to others, that were similarly outside the 
limits of my normal conception. How might anthropology in conversation enable a 
direct engagement with Islam that does not make Islam or Muslims objects, to be 
comprehended though the researcher’s own thought concepts, cultural such as 
‘Moroccan folk Islam’, or social such as relations of power, questions of agency, or 
strategies to negotiate within socially produced gendered hierarchies? 
 
Three recent responses by anthropologists to this problem are for me represented in 
the work of Carrithers, Viveiros de Castro, and Ingold. All three approaches have a 
degree of resonance with Levinas’ ideal. Each in their own way make knowing an 
ethical practice rather than a supposedly morally neutral quest for objective 
knowledge. They dismantle the position of the anthropologist as the privileged 
producer of systematic thinking and theory and recognise an essential intellectual 
equivalence, although not identity, of anthropologists and those they engage with. 
They furthermore see critique as being central to anthropology as a mode of 
knowing. As Ingold as puts it: ‘An education in anthropology … does more than 
furnish knowledge about the world ... it rather educates our perception of the world, 
and opens our eyes and minds to other possibilities of being’ (Ingold 2008: 82). 
However, none are entirely satisfactory as principles for the direct, non-objectifying 
engagement with Islam that I am seeking. 
 
Carrithers has called anthropology a moral science of possibilities and its practice an 
‘engaged learning’, a sharing of perspectives. Fieldwork is an enterprise in which 
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anthropologists invest their physical and emotional selves. They develop an ‘ironic’ 
stance, inhabiting alternative understandings and categories without letting go of 
their own. The ironic perspective opens up the multiple worlds of possibilities that 
de-centre the seemingly universal, taken-for-granted categories and assumptions 
that the anthropologist might have occupied before the encounter with others 
(Carrithers 2005). 
 
Carrithers’s vision recognises that knowledge is grounded in the morally charged 
relations that the anthropologist develops with others, and that these engender a 
sense of mutual worth and trust. But his concept of irony is founded on an 
underlying idea of cultures, worlds, or rationalities that the anthropologist and their 
others inhabit, albeit as moral agents creatively and intersubjectively acting upon 
one another rather than mechanically reproducing cultural scripts. Indeed, with 
something like this in mind I sought to take seriously the subjective experience of 
interaction with spirits in Uzbekistan, adopting an ‘as if’ or ironic stance. In doing so I 
needed to place the experience of those I described rather uncomfortably in a 
version of the culture concept, which I attempted to soften by presenting as a 
flexible resource that affords possibilities for perception. Thinking about the 
experiences of jinn possession in Morocco, I would similarly need to place those 
individuals within my construction of ‘their’ culturally produced rationality, and 
doing so would assume a degree of coherence in their experiences that would be the 
product of my own intellectual work, my own interpretive ‘fiction’ as Geertz has put 
it. 
 
The problem of the culture concept is even more evident in much of the recent turn 
to ontology, a leading proponent of which has been Viveiros de Castro who has 
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posed the question ‘What happens if we take native thought seriously?’ (Viveiros de 
Castro 2003). By this he does not mean representing the Other ‘in their own terms’. 
Rather, in a position that recalls the spirit of el-Zein’s argument, his appeal is to 
dismantle the model of knowledge production that places the anthropologist in the 
privileged role of reflexive conceptual thinker, while the native is positioned in a 
spontaneously inhabited worldview, the raw material for the anthropologist’s 
creative production of universal theory. The concern of anthropology should be with 
ontology, the conceptual imagination, ‘the faculty of creating those intellectual 
objects and relations which furnish the indefinitely many possible worlds of which 
humans are capable.’ The native is as much engaged in this process as is the 
anthropologist; in terms of ontology, the anthropologist’s and the native’s thought 
are of the same kind. 
 
For many of its proponents the ontological turn represents precisely a move to found 
a critical knowing in an engagement with alterity (Henare et al. 2007), but the 
question is how this alterity is imagined. Viveiros de Castro’s representation of an 
‘Amerindian multinaturalism’ has been criticised as being a generalised, overly 
coherent depiction that is the artefact of the anthropologist’s own thought (Bessire 
& Bond 2014; Ramos 2012). For there to be a native ontology there needs to be a 
generalised native. The encounters with jinn possession in Morocco would need to 
be understood as expressing ‘their’ ontology radically different to ‘our’ naturalist, 
secular scientific one. Could Islam itself constitute such an ontology? With the idea of 
ontology we could not hope to encompass the multiplicity of diverse voices and 
interpretations within the historically developed and ongoing body of philosophy, 
thought, and interpretation of sacred text carried out by Muslims with reference to 
Divine Revelation. This question aside, can the experience of jinn possession by an 
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individual in a small town in Morocco be neatly placed within a notional Islamic 
ontology? Would we need to identify, or rather fabricate, a Moroccan variant of an 
Islamic ontology in a return to Geertz’s notion of culture? Can any individual be 
confined to a single ontology, or is ambiguity and contradiction part of the natural 
human condition as Scheilke has argued? The notion of ontology produces Muslims 
as Viveiros de Castro’s ‘natives’ and Islam as their ontology, an object that could only 
come into being as the product of the anthropologist’s own thought.  
 
The problem of the object is one that Ingold addresses in his call for anthropology to 
be not a study of people but a way of studying with people (Ingold 2008; Ingold & 
Lucas 2007). ‘Anthropology of’ for Ingold tends to transform anything anthropology 
encounters into an object amenable to analysis in its own analytical terms; as social 
relations or cultural production of meaning. Ingold focuses particularly on 
encounters with material objects such as artworks or buildings. Where Levinas, 
whose thought developed in the experience of Nazi Germany, sees the totalising 
relation as one of domination and tyranny, Ingold sees the problem as an inability to 
engage with the creative processes that bring these objects into being. In common 
with Viveiros de Castro, Ingold recognises people as engaged in the same enterprise 
as anthropologists. Not in terms of the ontologies or conceptual worlds they create, 
but on the level of practice. We are all engaged in doing anthropology for Ingold, we 
are commonly ‘concerned with exploring, interpreting and describing the worlds we 
inhabit, the ways we perceive them’ (Ingold & Lucas 2007: 291), so he advocates an 
anthropology with art or architecture for example. I have found Ingold’s idea of 
doing anthropology with inspirational, but it lacks the recognition of the irreducible 
alterity of the other that is foundational to Levinas’s ideal of knowing and what 
makes knowing critique. What Ingold’s anthropology with emphasises instead is 
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what is shared, the common practice of the anthropologist and their co-interpreter 
or explorer. This is not to say that practicing anthropology with necessarily lacks 
critique, but this critique, I would argue, is founded in the implicit, unacknowledged 
choice of the anthropologist to engage with people or situations that challenge their 
own spontaneity. Without explicitly recognising the relation with the alterity of the 
other as the source of anthropological knowing, doing anthropology with in itself 
could too easily become an exploration and extension of the anthropologist’s own 
thought, an extension of the self. 
 
The question remains of how to think with my encounters with jinn possession in 
Morocco and the people involved, without attributing to them an ontology, 
worldview, or culture. In developing a Levinas-inspired conversation with Islam, who 
or what would be the other or others, and what form would the conversation take? 
In the next section I will discuss how the idea of an Islamic tradition might be 
developed in a non-objectifying way, as an ongoing conversation in which the 
anthropologist might participate.  
 
 … an Islamic tradition 
Following Joel Robbins’s call for anthropology to develop a different relation to 
Christian theology, to take seriously its intellectual positions and not just to 
appropriate it as ethnography, there has been a broad move to develop a ‘post-
secular’ anthropology. Could this move point to how we might think about and 
engage with an Islamic tradition, especially as some of its contributors work not in 
Christian but Muslim contexts (Hoffstaedter 2013; Kahn 2011)? It was Robbins’s 
paper on the ‘awkward relationship’ between anthropology and theology that first 
prompted me to think that something that might be imagined as the Islamic tradition 
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of thought, as well as Christian theology, might be approached similarly to the way 
anthropologists are accustomed to engaging with (the Western tradition of) 
philosophy (Robbins 2006). 
 
A problem, however, is that this move is once more founded on the idea of 
contrasting ontologies, Christian, Islamic, and others, versus what Joel Kahn has 
called the secular position of scientific naturalism (Kahn 2011: 78). There is a lot of 
resonance in the post-secular move with Levinas’s ideal of knowing. Kahn, who 
draws on Levinas’s idea of the overflowing of experience, calls for a mutually 
transformative conversation between both sides, secular scientific and religious 
reason, instead of the more typical ‘bracketing’ of experience where the 
anthropologist merely suspends disbelief in the face of the Other. Philip Fountain 
argues that anthropology should not think about religion but with it so that the 
universal superiority of secular thought is decentred. (Fountain 2013: 315-6). But 
engagement or conversation continues to be imagined between alternative 
ontologies, worldviews, or rationalities that are always and inevitably generalised, 
conceptual objects. 
 
The idea of an Islamic tradition that I am suggesting would be understood as the 
historically developed and ongoing textually recorded body of philosophy, theology, 
and debate that has at its centre Divine Revelation through the Prophet Muhammad, 
and also the lived experience of people who relate to it in diverse, creative ways. 
Levinas’s ideal of infinity directs us away from representing or thinking about this 
tradition as in any way a coherent ontology. There is no more coherence in the 
Islamic tradition, even the purely textual tradition of philosophy and theological 
debate, than in what we might gloss as the western philosophical tradition. It is 
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telling that in my scholarly writing I would typically need to qualify the former with 
‘Arab’ or ‘Islamic’ but can refer to the latter as simply ‘philosophy’ in order to be 
understood by most readers. Rather, the Islamic tradition I am developing here is a 
gathering together in conversation of distinctive voices and experiences, in texts and 
in lives across time and space. The anthropologist would seek to engage with this 
conversation not as the representative of a naturalist or secular sensibility but as an 
individual. Unlike the idea of ontology, this conversation does not come into 
objective existence through the intellectual work of the anthropologist who 
identifies system and coherence that the ‘native’, being immersed in the process of 
living within their own cultures or ontologies, does not. The anthropologist can 
assume no ownership but must visit as a guest, his or her own interpretations and 
responses remaining open to challenge from multiple perspectives, from within 
anthropology, from the discipline of Islamic studies, and from voices in the Islamic 
tradition itself. 
 
The encounter with jinn possession in Morocco that I related above is part of the 
Islamic tradition as ongoing conversation alongside, for example, the textual 
contributions produced within the scholarly traditions of the classical legal schools of 
Sunni Islam, those of philosophers, Sufi thinkers, or the thought and practice of 
contemporary Muslims, where all this is oriented in one way or another to the act of 
Divine Revelation. There is no hierarchic separation here between the ‘everyday’ 
thought and practice of ‘ordinary’ Muslims, those who strive for pious ethical 
subjectivities, or the understandings expressed in the diverse forms of textual and 
other scholarship. Moreover, my encounters with others in Morocco and their 
experiences of possession are with individuals capable of occupying multiple, even 
contradictory perspectives simultaneously including, perhaps, what might be 
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understood as scientific naturalist ones. Any common ground or exchange of 
perspectives that would occur in this ground of personal conversation and relation. 
As an individual, I am no more reducible to a naturalist or secular ontology than the 
Moroccans I met are reducible to any Islamic ontology or vernacular theology that I 
would have to infer from my understanding of their experience. This is not to say 
that ideologies or discourses that could be described as secular, scientific, modernist, 
or Islamic in one form or another do not exist, do not have effects, nor that they 
should not be examined. Just that, following Levinas, individuals always exceed the 
limits of any concept and should not be subsumed within them. 
 
Levinas’s ideal of knowing as moral practice and critique is founded on a calling into 
question of my own spontaneity in conversation with an other. The unsettling 
experience of observing jinn exorcism and my further conversations about personal 
experiences of possession are the starting point for my knowing. Anthropology in 
conversation with an Islamic tradition would continue in further personal encounters 
in Morocco and elsewhere as well as with textual and scholarly productions. In 
seeking to explore the new possibilities for thought I might look, for example, to 
discussions within works of Qur’anic interpretation, cosmology, or Sufi philosophy on 
the existence of jinn and sorcery, and the experience of possession. Might some of 
this induce thinking about the nature of good and evil as a material phenomenon, as 
well as moral, aesthetic or spiritual state (Hadromi-Allouche 2012)? Reflecting on the 
recitation of Qur’anic verses, how might an understanding of the Qur’an as Divine 
Speech prompt me to rethink the nature of ‘text’ and ‘word’ (Graham 1987 ), what a 
memorisation and recitation is and does in the person, the listener, and the world? 
Might a reading of the Sufi Ibn al-‘Arabī’s cosmology on the nature of being, his 
thinking on the faculty of the creative imagination, prompt different thinking on the 
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nature of perception, being human, and what might be understood as the material 
world? Not only for Sufis or Muslims, but for life more generally? Do practices and 
experiences that anthropologists tend to label as magic, spirit possession, witchcraft, 
or sorcery, need to be conceptualised as distinctive culturally inflected responses to 
empirically real processes such as economic dislocation, the workings of a person’s 
psychology, or as some other social or cultural process? Or does an engagement with 
the Islamic tradition prompt questions directly about the phenomenon of 
imagination itself, rather than treating imagination as an index for something else 
that is more ‘real’ (Mittermaier 2011).  
 
In practical terms this will mean a much closer engagement with the academic 
discipline of Islamic studies than has been typical in the past for anthropologists. Not 
only does this discipline make much of the Islamic textual tradition of theology and 
philosophy accessible to non-specialists, but its mode of knowing is often one that I 
have been arguing is central to anthropology as a disciplinary project. As Henry 
Corbin, a prominent scholar of Ibn al-‘Arabī has put it: 
 
To our mind the best explanation of Ibn ‘Arabī remains Ibn ‘Arabī himself. 
The only means of understanding him is to become for a moment his 
disciple, to approach him as he himself approached many masters of Ṣūfism. 
(Corbin 1969: 5) 
 
What I am proposing is an explicit, conscious stepping away from making our 
research and writing about Islam, Muslims, or Sufis as such, away from the explicit or 
implicit assumption of an analytical object. Following Levinas’s ideal of the 
irreducible individuality of the person and of knowing as critique, I am proposing an 
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anthropology in conversation with an Islamic tradition where my encounter with 
others prompts questions and reflections that I express in my academic writing. The 
aim would not be the representation of an Islamic ontology addressed to an 
audience of fellow secular, scientific naturalists. It would rather be the reflections of 
an individual anthropologist that I hope would find resonance with others. It is an 
effort to engage directly and ethnographically with an Islamic tradition without 
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